FROM.  THE COMMANDING OFFICER H.M.S. "ICARUS".

DATE.  2nd DECEMBER 1939.        No. 217/81.

TO.    THE CAPTAIN (D), THIRD DESTROYER FLOTILLA.

SUBJECT.   ATTACK ON ENEMY SUBMARINE.

The attached report of attack on an enemy submarine is forwarded in accordance with C.A.F.O.2600/39.

                                    (sd) C.D. Maud

                                    Lieutenant Commander

Narrative of Attack on U-Boat in Position 60° 40'N, 02° 08'E.

At 0745 on Wednesday 29th November while I was proceeding at 15 knots rejoining S.S. "Vina", who was at that time about a mile ahead of me steering 075 degrees, Leading Signalman W.G.GIDDINGS, Official Number P/Jx 136912, sighted the conning tower of a submarine 50 degrees on the starboard bow silhouetted against the red glow of the eastern sky.

2. There was a considerable swell running making picking up the target a difficult matter and the estimation of range a matter of more guess work than usual. I rang down "Full Speed" and altered course to 120 degrees, estimating range to be 4,000 yards and submarines course about 030 degrees.

3. The sighting must have been almost simultaneous as the conning tower disappeared very shortly after our first sighting. I judged the time to be not more than 20 seconds between first sighting and final dipping of the conning tower - during this time it was only visible intermittently owing to the heavy swell. It was due to this that neither the foremost guns nor the director picked up the target in time to open fire.

4. The estimation of range being more chancy than usual and my A/S set being out of action due to the spare transmitting valve having burnt out the previous day, I decided to lay a string of depth charges, set to 250 feet, across the submarine's track at 300 yards intervals beginning at 3,400 yards from first sighting, thinking that there would be a better chance of getting close with one charge than dropping a pattern of 5 which might easily be 1,000 yards out for range. Charges were accordingly dropped at 3,400 - 3,700 - 4,000 - 4,300 - 4,600 yards from the position of sighting, the range being taken off the Chernikeef Log.

5. On the approach coarse I searched for signs of the submarine's diving position, swirl on the surface - oil slick or bubbles, but I could see none of these signs. After dropping the final charge I reduced speed, altered coarse 180 degrees and searched back for signs of wreckage. Nothing was found.

6. I patrolled the area at 12 knots until the arrival of "Kingston" and "Kashmir" at 1045. I passed the submarine's original diving position to "Kashmir" and then rejoined S.S. "Vina" in accordance with instructions from Read-Admiral (D).

7. H.M.S. "Kashmir" reported the destruction of this U-boat in her signal timed 1330/29.

SECRET

From:-  THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. KASHMIR .

Date:-  5th December 1939   No.

To:-  ADMIRAL COMMANDING ORKNEYS AND SHETLANDS. 

      (Copies to:- Rear Admiral (D), H.M.S. AURORA .

                   Captain (D), 5th Destroyer Flotilla, H.M.S. KELLY

                   Commanding Officer, H.M.S. KINGSTON ).

REPORT ON THE SINKING OF GERMAN SUBMARINE -  U.35

SUBMITTED: -

   The following report of the sinking of the German Submarine, U.35, in estimated position 60 degrees 53 minutes North, 2 degrees 49 minutes East at noon on 29th November 1939, is forwarded in accordance with H.W.O. No. 24, paragraph 4. No I.D. forms A.E.G. have been received in KASHMIR.

   2. At 1037 the KASHMIR was ordered by Rear-Admiral Commanding Home Fleet Destroyers to proceed with the KINGSTON and close the ICARUS  who had been attacking a submarine. On receiving a range and bearing of the submarine from the ICARUS, the KINGSTON was ordered to take station on the port beam of the KASHMIR and a search was started.

   3.  About 2 miles before the reported position was reached KINGSTON obtained a contact. Contact was also obtained by KASHMIR at a somewhat greater range. The KINGSTON then attacked and dropped three depth charges with no visible result. Considerable difficulty was then experienced in KASHMIR in maintaining contact, due partly to the eddies set up by the depth charges and partly to a temporary failure of her Asdic set at this moment, and a reliable contact was not regained and an attack started until the KINGSTON had started a second attack.

   4.  As the KASHMIR was approaching on her attacking course, the KINGSTON's second pattern having exploded some 400 yards ahead at 1158, the submarine was seen to surface directly ahead with headway on. The crew were coming on deck and some of them started to man their gun. On a shot being fired across the bows of the submarine by the KASHMIR, they left their gun, held up their hands and started to abandon the submarine whose engines were then stopped. No depth charges were dropped by the KASHMIR.

   5.  The KASHMIR then approached the submarine from aft and picked up 4 officers and 27 ratings while the KINGSTON carried out a circular sweep. On completion of the latter, the KINGSTON closed and rescued the remaining survivors including the Captain.

   6. As soon as the submarine surfaced, she began to sink by the stern and by the time the KASHMIR had approached only the conning tower and part of the foredeck were above the surface. She sank by the stern about 20 minutes after she surfaced. She is estimated to have been of 500 tons displacement and carried one gun. She bore no identification number. Her number - U.35. - was learnt from the survivors. She sank in about 120 fathoms.

   7. The following is a summary of information subsequently gleaned from the survivors:-

(a) Two other submarines were operating in the vicinity. One of them was the one that sunk H.M.S. ROYAL OAK. This information was obtained independently from both officers and ratings and it was as result of it that I decided to remain in the area and continue the search. (For Prien for about 12 hours).

(b) They had sighted H.M.S. NORFOLK  on 28th November but were too far off to attack.

(c) They had seen two destroyers the previous night (November 28/29), but it was too rough to attack.

(d) They had been at sea for a fortnight, operating in the same area. They usually do 5 weeks at sea followed by 4 in harbour.

(e) Their speed on the surface was 11 knots, submerged 8 - 9 knots.

(f) They expressed surprise at being "Heard" while they were stopped, although they were "very deep".

(g) As a result of KINGSTON's first pattern, the hydroplanes and wireless were put out of action and the periscope glass was broken. The second pattern put all the lights out, holed her aft and jammed the hydroplanes in the surfacing position. She went full speed ahead to try and regain control but came to the surface and stopped engines when the KASHMIR's shot was fired.

 None of the attacks prior to the KINGSTON's appear to have incommoded them, though it is possible they were directed at another submarine.

(h) Previous History

1. Was in company with submarine that sank H.M.S. COURAGEOUS . It was stated that the other submarine reached home in spite of being attacked by 96 depth charges.

2. U.35 claims to have sunk 40,000 tons of shipping. One ship was sunk while in convoy escorted by 6 destroyers. During the subsequent attack her periscope was damaged.

3. She landed the crew of a Greek steamer  in Dingle Bay , and was not damaged be a flying boat which attacked her at this time.

4. Quite recently she had 2 torpedoes fired at her by a British submarine .

   8.  The names of the survivors picked up by the KASHMIR are included in the Appendix to this report. Several of them left the ship wearing articles of clothing belonging to officers and men of the ship as they had lost their own. It would be appreciated if these could he recovered and returned to KASHMIR. Their good bearing and behaviour for the 2 days they were on hoard left nothing to be desired.

   9.  H.M.S. KINGSTON is rendering a separate report, as some time is likely to elapse before she is again in company in harbour, this report is forwarded without having been discussed with the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. KINGSTON, who, it is considered, carried out his attacks in a most efficient manner.

            (Sgd.) H.A. King

                   COMMANDER

                   IN COMMAND.

 NOTE (1975)

   The German ratings were accommodated in the lower Mess Deck, displacing the Stokers, with an armed Sentry at the top of the hatch. They were exercised occasionally and were fallen in for entering harbour at Greenoch . The Officers lived in the Ward Room. I spoke only to the Senior Officer.

   There was some trouble subsequently with C-in-C. about Press coverage. Vide second sentence of Nelson's final prayer, which I used to read to the Ship's Company on the rare occasions we were in harbour on Sunday.  

 APPENDIX

List of Survivors taken on board KASHMIR from U.35

Name                           Rank or Rating.

Erden .                          Oberleutnant zur See.

Raabe .                         Matrose (Arzt).

Stamer .                        Oberleutnant Engenieur.

Roters .                         Leutnant zur See.

Hengen .                        Stabs-Obersteuermann.

Janfen .                          Mechanikersmaat.

V. der Helm .                Maschinenmaat.

Pietsch .                        Ober-Maschinenmaat.

Muller Martin .              Matrosen-Hauptgefreiter.

Wiegand .                      Mechanikers-Obergefreiter.

Kienast .                        Maschinen-Gefreiter.

V. der Putten .               Matrosen-Gefreiter.

Thieme .                                    ditto.

Fichte .                          Funk-Obergefreiter.

Schutt .                          Maschinen-Obergefreiter.

Schrader .                     Maschinen-Obergefreiter.

Roloff .                                      ditto.

Brupe .                                      ditto.

Konrad .                       Matrose-Obergefreiter.

Groper .                        Maschinen-Obergefreiter.

Brukmaier .                   Maschinen-Gefreiter.

Dobele .                        Maschinen-Maat.

Weber                                       ditto.

Horstkoffer                                ditto.

Oppermann .                             ditto.

Kifner .                          Mechaniker-Obergefreiter.

Sommerer .                   Ober-funker-gefreiter.

Liebau .             Bootsmannsmaat.

Freier .                          Maschinen-Gefreiter.

Fakob .                         Mechaniker-Obergefreiter.

Parthun .                        Maschinen-Hauptgefreiter.

SECRET

SUBJECT    REPORT OF ATTACK ON ENEMY SUBMARINE

FROM …   COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. “KINGSTON”

DATE …    7th December 1839.              No. 233/196

TO …        THE SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY

            (Through Captain (D), Fifth Destroyer Flotilla, H.M.S. “Kelly”)

Submitted.

            The following report is submitted in accordance with C.A.F.O. 2600/39 –

1.      Ship – H.M.S. “Kingston”

2.      Date and Time – 29^th November 1939 at 1150 G.M.T.

3.      Position - 60° 53’ N. 2° 47’ E.

4.      Distance at which Submarine was sighted) –   See

5.      Distance at which Submarine submerged  )     narrative

6.      Description of the Submarine – German – U.35.

8.      Attacked with Depth Charges –

Type – D.III

Number Carried – 30

Number dropped and fired from throwers – 6

Depth set – 300 feet

Whether they functioned properly – Yes

11. Depth of Water – 120 fathoms

12. Wind, Weather and Visibility – S.W. 3; Overcast sky; Visibility very good; Sea and swell 34.

            2. General description of the circumstances is as follows –

            3. H.M.S. “Kingston” and H.M.S. “Kashmir” were ordered by Rear Admiral (D), to join H.M.S. “Icarus” and hunt a submarine sighted by the latter at 0700. “Icarus” signaled that the submarine had been last seen three miles to the westward. “Kingston” and “Kashmir” steered towards this position, and at 1102 “Kingston” obtained Asdic contact. An attack was made unsuccessfully at 1123. The throwers were not fired then because of the proximity of “Kashmir”. “Kashmir” then commenced an attack, but later abandoned it owing to a technical fault in her installation. “Kingston” attacked a second time at 1153. The throwers misfired, because the charges were wet. The centre charge of the three dropped from the trap hit the submarine aft. She decided to surface before her flooding became out of hand, and at 1153 she broke surface. Her crew fell in on deck, and then took to the water. The submarine U.35 sank at 1204. All her crew were picked up.

            4. A rough diagram of the action is attached.

                                    P. Somerville

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER

COMMANDING OFFICER

Captain (D), Fifth Destroyer Flotilla, H.M.S. “Kelly”

H.M.S "KINGSTON",

No. 287/186

c/o G.P.O. London.

7th December 1939.

Sir,

            I have the honour to submit the following report on the sinking of the German submarine "U-35" by H.M.S. "Kingston" on 29th November 1939.

            2. H.M.S. "Kingston" and H.M.S. "Kashmir" were in company with Rear Admiral (D), Home Fleet, at 1030, when they were detached to join H.M.S. "Icarus" who was standing by the position in which an enemy submarine was seen to dive at 0700. "Icarus" was unable to operate against the submarine as her Asdic apparatus was out of action.

            3. "Icarus" signalled that the submarine had last been seen bearing 304° 3½ miles from her position when "Kingston" closed her. Course was therefore altered towards this position of the submarine, and sweeping was commenced. "Kashmir", arriving later, took up a position 2000 yards to the Southward of "Kingston".

            4. Contact was obtained at 1102 at a range of 900 yards. Having confirmed it, course was altered to windward to take up a position favourable for attack. Contact was lost at 1111 for five minutes, due to the faulty working of the Recorder. This instrument was not subsequently used.

            5. At 1121 an attack was commenced, and three charges, set to 300 feet, were dropped at 1123. The throwers were not fired because “Kashmir” might have been endangered. This attack was unsuccessful, and the Plot later suggested that the attack had been delivered on the wake of the submarine.

            6. About 1130 “Kashmir” started an attack, but abandoned it because of the failure of her Recorder. The submarine passed very close to “Kingston” shortly after this, but an attack was impossible as the ship was practically stopped, being then Directing Vessel for “Kashmir”.

            7. Having moved up-wind, “Kingston” commenced a second attack at 1148. Three charges, also set to 300 feet, were dropped at 1150. The throwers misfired, their impulse charges being wet after the heavy weather the previous day.

            8. The centre charge of these three exploded close to the submarine’s engine room. She began to fill with water, and in order to save his crew, her captain decided to come up at once. She broke surface at 1153, at a steep angle, bows up. The captain succeeded in correcting her trim, and her crew then fell in on deck. As the submarine began to settle they took to the water and all were later picked up by the ships’ boats. The submarine sank at 1204.

            9. When the U-boat first came to the surface, it was hoped that there would be an opportunity of boarding her in search of papers, and the officer in charge of the whaler was instructed accordingly: time was, however, too short for this to be done.

            10. An all round sweep for a second submarine was carried out while the men in the water were being picked up. This was without result.

            11. Conditions for operating Asdics were good. This does not, however, detract from the credit due to the A/S Control Officer, Sub-Lieutenant G.J. Kirkby, R.N., and all concerned in the successful result obtained.

            12. Despite the very small extent of target, which was never more than 7°, contact was maintained throughout the operation, except on the occasion mentioned in paragraph 4 above. This reflects great credit on the First operator, Leading Seaman R.J. Bowring, Official Number P/J.95764, and the S.D. Instructor, C.P.O. P.J. Mansfield, Official Number, P/J.87374, who assisted the A/S Control Officer on the Bridge.

            13. The Chernikeef Log was used in both attacks. The success of the second attack was largely due to C.P.O. Mansfield’s extremely accurate ranging with the chronoscope, and also to his quick appreciation of changes in the Doppler effect.

            14. Great Assistance was derived throughout from the Plot, which was kept by Midshipman J.D. Winstanley, R.N.R. His accurate forecast of the movements of the submarine contributed to the success of the operation.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

P. Somerville

Lieutenant Commander

Commanding Officer

II.

No. 0320D.

The Rear Admiral (D),

Home Fleet.

(Copies to The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Kashmir, The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Kingston).

Submitted in continuation of Admiral Commanding Orkneys and Shetlands No. 317/O.S.13 of 8th December, 1939.

            2. The Kingston did remarkably well, especially as her recorder was out of action.

            3. With reference to Admiralty Message 1813/9 Dec., the arrival of Admiralty Letter C.W. of 4th December is being awaited before any recommendation is forwarded.

            4. With reference to paragraph 8, I interviewed all 4 officers and 2 men from U 35 at the Tower of London on 8th December. The officers deny that she broke surface intentionally, but maintain that she was so much down by the stern that at the speed they were moving they could not keep her down. Once up they decided to surrender.

            5. The officers asked me to give their respects to the Captain of the particular destroyer which picked them up, and to thank him warmly for the fair and kind treatment they received from all onboard.

            6. With reference to paragraph 10, the Captain of U-35 commended the Kashmir’s and Kingston’s tactics whereby one circled round while the other picked up survivors because any second submarine might torpedo a stopped destroyer unless they knew for certain she was picking up German survivors.

            7. The Captain of U-35 told me that German Battlecruisers escorted by destroyers had recently been out raiding in the North Sea and implied strongly that they would be out again sooner than we might expect. I reported this without delay to the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence in person.

            8. A copy of the report in accordance with C.A.F.O. 2600/39 (Kingston’s No. 233/196 of 7th December) is also attached. Already forwarded to Admiralty.

                        Louis Mountbatten

Captain (D)

Fifth Destroyer Flotilla

H.M.S. Kelly

14th December, 1939.

SECRET.

Subject..           REPORT ON SINKING OF GERMAN SUBMARINE U.35.

From ….          Rear Admiral (D), Home Fleet, H.M.S. TITANIA.

Date ….           17^th December, 1939.                        No. 629/H.D.00571.

To ….              SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

                        (Copies to:-      Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet;

                                                Captains (D), Third and Fifth Destroyer Flotillas;

                                                Commanding Officers, H.M. Ships

   KINGSTON, KASHMIR and ICARUS

            Reports from Commanding Officers of H.M. Ships ICARUS and KINGSTON on the sinking of the ‘U’ boat U.35 on 29^th November, 1939 are forwarded herewith. Report from the Commanding Officer, H.M. Ship KASHMIR was forwarded to Admiralty in submission No.317/O.S.413 of 8^th December, 1939 from Admiral Commanding, Orkneys and Shetlands.

            2. The sinking of the ‘U’ boat is again an example of good team work and while to KINGSTON rightly belongs the credit for a most successful hunt, it was due to the ICARUS that the hunt developed.

            3. ICARUS’ action in remaining in the vicinity after her first attack till help arrived nearly three hours later feigning to hunt, though in fact unable to do so, as her Asdic set was out of action, was the governing factor which led to KINGSTON’s success.

                                                R.H.C. Hallifax

                                                Rear Admiral.

Enclosures:

            ICARUS’ No.217/81 of 2^nd December, 1939 and minute II thereto.

Sinking of U.35

Honours and Awards Committee have considered the claims of H.M.S.s Kingston and Kashmir for awards for their parts in sinking U.35 and capturing her crew.

With the advice of Anti-Submarine Warfare Division they submit that Kingston's share entitles her Commanding Officer, Lieut. Commander Somerville, to a D.S.O.: and that Commander King, C.O. of Kashmir should be "mentioned in despatches".

R, Gleadowe (?)

Headq. ..

Yes. But some honours for the men must be included: (say)

3 for the Kingston &

2 for the Kashmir.

Please submit complete proposals.

L..

21.XII

The First Lord approved award to COs of Kashmir and Kingston.

Awards to ratings in A/S Destroyers are being gazetted at ... this week.

The King has approved.

R.Gleadowe (?)

25/XII

Noted.

2.  KINGSTON appears to have been somewhat lucky in securing a "hit". It is not, however, proposed to remark on this attack until report of ICARUS is received. KINGSTON's report does, however, bring out the importance of destroyers obtaining sufficient time for A/S and other training which is difficult at present with the many duties that they are called upon to perform.

(signature)

D.O.D.(H).

29.12.39.

Noted.

D.S.D. does not quite see why D.O.D.(H) considers 'Kingston's' attack lucky. It was extremely accurate.

Philip F Glover (?)

D.S.D.

15.1.40.  

Noted with interest. Fully concurring with the remarks of R.A.(D), Home Fleet.

2.  It is observed that the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. KINGSTON, was awarded the D.S.O. for the destruction of this U-boat, before the official report was received.

3.  In view of the remarks of R.A.(D), Home Fleet, it is considered the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. ICARUS, is also deserving of some award.

(signature)

DIRECTOR OF ASNTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE.

19.1.40.

Fully concur with R.A.D. paragraph 3.

It is considered that ICARUS' feat of reporting the exact position of the submarine after an interval of nearly three hours without the help of asdics deserves high recognition.

Ralph Edward (?)

For D.O.D.(H)

21/1/40.